Wife-Swap Cops Canned by Louisiana Sheriff, Lose Appeal

BOSSIER PARISH, La.—Brandon Coker and Michael Golden had been besties since they were 16. They did nearly everything together, though Golden married his wife Farah in 1995, and Coker didn't wed wife Lauren until 2001, and the couples lived within a few miles of each other in Haughton, Louisiana, so they socialized pretty often with activities such as cookouts, gardening, card games—hell, they even played with their kids together.

But then a funny thing happened: Sometime in 2014, Brandon Coker fell in love with Farah Golden, and during that same year, Michael Golden fell in love with Lauren Coker. That being the case, they each planned to divorce their current spouses, and in preparation for that—and after all, they are all friends—on Halloween of that year, the new couples started living together.

Just one problem, though: Brandon Coker and Michael Golden just happened to be sheriff's deputies in Bossier Parish, smack in the "heart" of the Bible Belt, and their boss, Julian Whittington, and his Chief Deputy, Charles Owens, didn't take kindly to the new living arrangement—and it didn't take long for them to try to do something about it.

"On November 3, 2014, Captain Charles Owens, Chief Deputy of the Bossier Parish Sheriff, instructed Brandon Coker and Michael Golden to report to Internal Affairs concerning their living arrangements," stated Coker and Golden in their complaint in U.S. District Court. "Chief Deputy Owens on the authority of Sheriff Whittington, placed them both on unpaid administrative leave due to their co-habitation with a woman who is not their wife. In addition, Chief Owens, on the authority of Sheriff Whittington, informed Plaintiffs that they could not return to work until they changed and stopped their living arrangements. Owens further instructed Plaintiffs that once they stopped and changed their living arrangements and Plaintiffs returned to work, Plaintiffs would be demoted and sent to work at the Sheriff’s detention and correctional centers at a reduced rate of pay. The demotion would result in a loss of pay and prestige. Owens further instructed Plaintiffs that even if they stopped the living arrangements and returned to work, a further condition of re-employment would be that the Plaintiffs cease all contact with the woman with whom they were currently co-habitation [sic] out of wedlock until they obtained divorces."

The problem? "Sheriff’s Code of Conduct, §3.01 II provides that a deputy conduct himself '... at all times in such a manner as to reflect the high standards of the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office.' The Section goes further to state a deputy is not to engage in any 'illegal, immoral or indecent conduct, nor engage in any legitimate act which when performed in view of the public, would reflect unfavorable [sic] upon the Bossier Sheriff’s Office.'"

Well, Coker's and Golden's new living arrangements weren't illegal, and since few people outside of the couples themselves and the sheriff and his deputy knew about it, the living-together wasn't a "legitimate act which ... would reflect unfavorabl[y] upon the Bossier Sheriff’s Office," so what's left?

"This Section is vague and does not inform deputies of what conduct violates the Section," the deputies noted in their lawsuit. "It permits the Sheriff to enforce his private code of morality upon his deputies, thereby, in some simulations, would operate to deprive deputies of their rights under the First Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause. Further the Sheriff conditions the holding of the office of deputy in Bossier Parish upon the acceptance of the Sheriff’s religious tenants [sic] in violation of the First Amendment and Article VI §3 by requiring a religious test. Further the Section is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. None of the terms used in the Section are defined. A violation of this Section can result in discipline up to and including discharge of a deputy found in violation. ... The Section prohibits any immoral or indecent acts which Sheriff Whittington in his sole discretion concludes is a violation of his religion’s tenants [sic]. Sheriff Whittington uses his view of Christianity in his discretion to determine what is a violation. No official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."

Not only that, but Coker and Golden did a little research of their own, and became "aware of the following acts: (1) a male deputy living as husband with his daughter in law (2) a female deputy engaging in lesbian acts with another male deputy’s wife (3) a male deputy and his wife engaging in what is colloquially known as 'swinging' or wife swapping (4) a male deputy who has engaged a prostitute for sexual favors."

Their conclusion? "It is thus pretextual for Defendants to label Plaintiffs’ living arrangements as immoral or indecent or a violation of the Section. The application of the Section to Plaintiffs in light of it not being applied to others equally described above, violates the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause. ... The discipline and discharge rendered against Plaintiffs violates their Freedom of Religion because they are being subjected to Sheriff Whittington’s personal views of Christianity. The Sheriff’s discipline and discharge of Plaintiffs also violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition of religious test to hold an office of public trust under Article 6§3. The office of deputy is an office of public trust."

To the unbiased eye, it looks as if Coker and Golden have a pretty good case that they've been victims of religious discrimination, not to mention unequal treatment even within their own department—but nevertheless, they lost at trial, so they appealed to the Fifth Circuit ... and managed to draw, as a panel member, Judge Edith H. Jones.

Those who've been following politics for a while may recognize Judge Jones' name. She was reportedly George H.W. Bush's number two pick for the U.S. Supreme Court had the number one candidate, David Souter, failed to be confirmed. (We're betting the elder Bush regretted that mistake for years.) In 2005, Bush Jr. also considered her for the same position, but the post was taken either by Chief Justice John Roberts or Associate Justice Samuel Alito. Philosophically, Jones is virulently anti-abortion—and one of her rulings invalidated a federal ban on the possession of machine guns.

So perhaps it's not too surprising that Jones and her fellow panelists shot down Coker's and Golden's appeal.

Speaking of the trial court's decision, Judge Jones wrote in the panel's appeal decision, "The court held first that the Code policies invoked against Coker and Golden are supported by the rational grounds of preserving a cohesive police force and upholding the public trust and reputation of the Sheriff’s Department."

Just one problem there: The appellants had said in their original complaint that the new living arrangements had not caused any friction between the men, who each worked in a different section of the sheriff's department, nor within their immediate or even extended families. In other words, everyone who actually mattered in the families' personal lives was on board with the new arrangement.

"Case law, including decisions of this circuit, has uniformly approved terminations of law enforcement officers for sexually inappropriate conduct," Jones continued. "There are no decisions to the contrary suggesting that the deputies, as public employees of law enforcement agencies, have constitutional rights to 'associate' with each other’s spouses before formal divorce. That Lawrence v. Texas (2003) expanded substantive constitutional rights relating to personal sexual choices does not mandate a change in policies relevant to public employment, where it was more recently reaffirmed that public employees necessarily shed some of their constitutional rights as a legitimate exchange for the privilege of their positions. Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006). The district court also concluded that the Code of Conduct is not unconstitutionally vague as written or enforced. It does not offend the fair notice requirements of due process, especially with regard to discipline that was not itself unconstitutional." [Citations omitted here and below]

"Immoral" and "indecent" aren't unconstitutionally vague, not to mention clearly religiously based? The new living arrangements constituted "sexually inappropriate conduct," even though no one outside of the families and the department even knew about it? The fact that Lawrence v. Texas legalized consensual sodomy for all citizens somehow doesn't apply to public employees?

But Jones went on to attempt to justify her prejudices.

"Sexual decisions between consenting adults take on a different color when the adults are law enforcement officers," she claimed. "Their enforcement duties include, for instance, crimes of human trafficking and spousal abuse that place them in sensitive positions with members of the public. Their involvement in relations that openly and 'notoriously' violate the legally sanctioned relationships of marriage and family is likely to besmirch the reputation of the Sheriff’s Department and hinder its ability to maintain public credibility. Moreover, these officers’ extramarital relationships, even if consensual and loving at the outset, have great potential to create internal dissension within the force. Finally, it is not hard to envision how the existence of Coker’s and Golden’s cohabitation with each other’s wives prior to divorce and remarriage might be adversely used in litigation concerning the deputies’ official conduct."

Funny thing: According to the 2010 census, roughly 7.5 million couples—that is, 15 million people—are living together, unmarried, in the U.S., and that number is likely a lot higher now. Moreover, as Coker and Golden pointed out in their lawsuit, even within the Bossier Parish Sheriff's Department, there are at least three "non-legally sanctioned relationships" that Whittington and Owens apparently didn't give a shit about—and who else in the department was going to care (read: engage in "internal dissension") whether Coker and Golden swapped wives? And as for it affecting litigation, that's an incredible stretch: "Now, Deputy Coker, did the fact that you were living with Deputy Golden's wife affect your ability to see Deputy Somebody shoot that fleeing suspect?"

No one's saying yet whether Coker and Golden will appeal this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, and considering the Court's current makeup, that'd be a dicey move in any case—but if they do, it should make for interesting case law.